The only reason the subject did not notice that the parrot changed color was not because he never experienced its color until asked about it, but because he never bothered to remember the color he experienced before it changed to red.

The change blindness task requires comparison of a currently experienced scene with one recalled from short-term memory. So the phenomenon of change blindness demonstrates a limited capacity short-term memory, not a limited capacity conscious experience. Phenomenologically, the parrot does not suddenly appear a certain color the moment we are asked about its color, it appears in experience to have been colored all along, and does not change when we attend to it, all that happens when we attend to it is that its color gets encoded and stored in short term memory, but its consciously perceived color remains the same whether it is attended or not.

In truth, we experience exactly as much detail as it seems that we experience, and no less. How could it possibly be otherwise? To claim that consciousness is less detailed than it is experienced to be, is a contradiction in terms!

© 2003 Steven Lehar, Manchester, MA USA. All rights reserved.