Finally published by Behavioral & Brain Sciences
This is a summarized version of my long and tortuous battle with reviewers and editors to get this paper published, with hyper-links to the full text of the exchange. It is organized chronologically, with a horizontal line at each new version of the paper, followed by the author's responses to the editor and the reviewers in the previous round of review, followed by the editor's and reviewers' new comments on this new version of the paper. However hyper-links are also provided with each set of the editor's and reviewer's comments that jump ahead to the author's responses to those critiques, and "[return to originating comment]" links back again, if you wish to see the responses to the critiques immediately. This whole process was played out over four and a half years, from first submission in September 1999 to publication in March 2004.
The world of visual experience appears a vivid three-dimensional structure. This provides direct evidence for a three-dimensional volumetric representation in the brain. I present a model of conscious experience as a volumetric spatial structure. This is not a neurophysiological theory, but a perceptual model, that models the experience directly, exactly as it is experienced.
The referees do see a potential target article there, but its empirical, theoretical, conceptual and scholarly scope need to be broadened and deepened first.
A "test-piloting" in BBS's online counterpart, Psycoloquy, might be a good idea too.
[Jump ahead to author's response]The author attempts to overthrow too many widely held beliefs without arguing against those positions in detail.
He does not systematically or convincingly defeat the standard counterarguments.
There is insufficient review of the actual phenomenon.
The author does not mention the different cognitive theories that have been presented.
A psycoloquy treatment of a shortened version of the paper might be at this point a good way to strengthen the author's case.
[Jump ahead to author's response]The provocativeness of the manuscript would excite a lot of comment and lead to productive interaction. I would be pleased to see it in print.
[Jump ahead to author's response]
Inserted whole new section on The Epistemological Divide
to broaden and deepen the empirical, theoretical, conceptual, and
scholarly scope. Inserted discussion of relevant work on
the epistemological question
including Chalmers (1996), Clark (1993), Harrison (1989), Hoffman (1998), Kant
(1781), Köhler (1971), Nagel 1974), Price (1932), Russell (1927), Smythies (1989, 1994). Inserted discussion of
relevant neural network theories including O'Brien & Opie (1999),
Zucker (1998), Grossberg et al. (1975, 1988), Lesher (1995).
Author's Response to Reviewer 1
Author's Response to Reviewer 2
A good deal of highly pertinent current and classical work
has been overlooked.
The author does not discuss relevance of theories of neural synchronization
to his model.
Reviewer
2: (New this round)
Title: Why use the definite article in the article's title ("...the
subjective conscious experience...")?
Reviewer 3:
(New this round. This guy is really bad!)
I find the present "aggressive tone" inadequate, and to be frank, not
very persuasive.
Reviewer
4:(formerly Reviewer 2)
I haven't changed my opinion since the first review I sent to you.
Inserted a whole new section
including a new Figure 1 to
clarify the relation of structural to functional isomorphism for the
benefit of reviewer 2. Wrote angry letter of complaint to the editor
about the whole review process! (see below)
Author's Response to Reviewer 1
Author's Response to Reviewer 2
AUTHOR'S RESPONSE to REVIEWER 3!
Author's Response to Reviewer 4
This revision was clearly not responsive to substantive referee's points.
Reviewer 1: (New this round)
The introduction is too long, esp. philosophical
name-dropping. Many theories are mentioned, but none are tackled
in depth.
Lehar addressed many of the minor issues we raised last round, but NONE of the
major ones!
Reviewer 3: (The really bad one!)
Unfortunately Lehar is unwilling to meet the challenge to improve
his manuscript and address *constructive* criticism.
Reviewer 4:(Formerly Reviewer 1)
Although not every point has been addressed, Lehar may be right
that it is simply impossible to examine in extensive
detail all of the myriad implications of his approach.
Reviewer 5:(New this round)
There is dubious scholarship and a series of non-sequiturs on philosophical issues.
Reviewer 6:(Formerly Reviewer 2, then Reviewer 4)
Lehar has done justice to the comments of his referees. He is somewhat
prickly in his responses but that is a
stylistic factor and I don't think bears on the substance of the
issues.
Editor's Comments on Author's Cover Letter
Editor's Comments on Reviewer 2
Editor's Comments on Reviewer 3
For changes this round, see Author's Response to Editor, below.
Author's Response to Reviewer 1
Author's Response to Reviewer 2
Author's Response to Reviewer 3 (the really bad
one!)
Author's Response to Reviewer 4
Author's Response to Reviewer 5
Author's Response to Editor's Comments on Author's Cover Letter
Author's Response to Editor's Comments on Reviewer 2
Author's Response to Editor's Comments on Reviewer 3
Many of the issues raised by Reviewer 1 are due to paradigmatic
nature of this proposal.
Paradigms require more general handling, and this is what
Reviewer 1 sees as "weak" and "idiosyncratic".
And the paradigmatic nature of the proposal is eminently
suitable for BBS rather than psycholoquy. Isn't that what
BBS is all about?
[Return to originating comment]
A paradigm can't help but overthrow many widely held beliefs!
I do defeat standard counter-arguments!
A detailed review of phenomena is inappropriate for a paradigmatic
thesis.
Citations of alternative theories are now included.
[Return to originating comment]
Thank you!
[Return to originating comment]
BBS Responds:
Revise & resubmit February 2001.
This draft is criticized as a "text-book" level general treatment.
[Jump ahead to author's response]
There is insufficient treatment of hemispatial neglect.
The model does not account for all of visual phenomenology.
This model explains the epistemology, but not ontology of conscious
experience. (neural vehicles v.s. phenomenal contents)
[Jump ahead to author's response]
Lehar overstates the "incredible" nature of indirect realism.
The pdp approach to neural computation holds
out some hope of *implementing* the very perceptual model Lehar defends.
It is not appropriate to describe the objects of experience as the
"product" or "output" of consciousness.
The author prematurely accepts Chalmers' pessimistic analysis of the "hard"
problem of consciousness.
Lehar will have to show how talk of "spatial analogs" is
consistent with his earlier insistence on functional isomorphism,
as opposed to structural or topographic isomorphism.
If Lehar subscribes to a
"picture-in-the-head" approach to visual perception he must do
more to defend it against the numerous objections it faces. There
is a voluminous psychological/philosophical literature on this
problem, with which Lehar should show at least some familiarity.
[Jump ahead to author's response]
The author must provide comparison with specific perceptual
theories, not general lines of investigation such as neural
network models
The author must provide a more structured comparison of his
proposal with other theories of space/form perception.
The set of predictions presented should concern perceptual
facts. After all this is a perceptual theory, not a theory of consciousness.
[Jump ahead to author's response]
Lehar's view is iconoclastic and provocative but, in my
estimation as legitimate as that of the "establishment". It is
well worth publishing in a journal dedicated to discussion of
varied points of view.
[Jump ahead to author's response]
Third version after second
review, September 2001.
There is a real problem with this whole review process!
The author is treated as a humble supplicant before a
panel of anonymous judges!
A paradigm cannot help but have implications across
many disciplines.
There is no space to discuss all those
implications exhaustively!
This paper makes several significant and revolutionary
proposals that seem to have escaped the reviewers' notice!
It deserves to be published as is!
[Return to originating comment]
Theories of neural synchronization are totally
irrelevant to this model!
Hello? is anybody reading this? I already
answered this question last time!
A "textbook level" general description is exactly what
is appropriate for a paradigmatic hypothesis!
No model can possibly account for all of
visual phenomenology!
The ontology of conscious experience is totally
irrelevant for a pure perceptual model!
[Return to originating comment]
I like the title as it stands! Isn't this my paper?
The PDP approach is totally inadequate to model the specific
phenomena addressed here!
The objects of experience ARE the "product" or "output"
of consciousness!
The reviewers themselves cite Chalmers without
reference to the "large literature" supposedly refuting him!
A new section has been added to address structural
v.s. functional isomorphism.
All of the "numerous objections" to the "picture-in-the-head"
theory reduce to the homunculus objection, which has
already been dispatched many times over!
[Return to originating comment]
Aggressive tone? I'll give you aggressive tone!
The "aggressive tone" is required to wake these people
up to their responsibility as scientists to justify the
foundations of their theoretical stance!
The competing hypotheses challenged by this paper are
not specific perceptual theories, but exactly
"more general lines of investigation, such as neural network
models." Its a paradigm fer Chrissake, don't you
get it?
Is it not the prerogative of the author to determine
whether this is a perceptual theory or a theory of consciousness?
This is the kind of review I hate most of all!
These criticisms are so vague as to be essentially meaningless!
If this paper were revised to meet with this reviewer's
satisfaction, I would no longer wish to be it's author!
[Return to originating comment]
Here is a man with the vision to recognize a paradigmatic
proposal when he sees one!
[Return to originating comment]
BBS Responds:
Revise & resubmit March 2002.
Editor:
The author is far too hasty on the vehicle/content distinction.
I suggest explicit consideration of incommensurability of physical
v.s. felt properties.
You need to address Shepard's "second-order isomorphism".
[Jump ahead to author's response]
The author must discuss higher-order isomorphisms.
The author must show how other theories cannot satisfy the phenomenological
constraints mentioned.
[Jump ahead to author's response]
Lehar's response is not really adequate, he has missed an
opportunity for communication and clarification.
He must reference Wolf Singer.
There is inconsistency between structural & functional isomorphism.
The author is careless about the vehicle/content distinction.
[Jump ahead to author's response]
This is unacceptable. I cannot recommend publication.
[Jump ahead to author's response]
I recommend that the paper is accepted in its present form
[Jump ahead to author's response]
Lehar should at least acknowledge Searle's argument that "a
computer isn't even a computer to a computer."
It is begging the question to assume that conscious
experience corresponds to electrochemical activity, rather
than merely correlating with it.
Searle is not being naive, but merely pointing out the
obvious, that we see the paper itself, not just a percept
of the paper.
Conscious experience need not be either in the head, nor out in
the world. It can be in neither place but still exist.
Causes and correlates need to be distinguished from identities.
How can the objects of consciousness also be the product of consciousness?
Lehar creates a misleading account of alternative positions in order
to bolster his contention that his own position is the only
tenable one.
In the conclusion, the range of "predictions" are not predictions.
[Jump ahead to author's response]
Since all of the reviewers feel that the manuscript is publishable in
some form, it seems to me that it is now ready for publication.
There are still substantive, prima facie conceptual issues that have
to be addressed.
You are not being asked to address the implications for
each BBS speciality exhaustively.
The referees are not rejecting a paradigm, they are raising
conceptual problems to which the target article needs to show more
responsiveness.
[Jump ahead to author's response]
The content/vehicle ambiguity remains.
Higher-order Shepardian isomorphism is not considered.
If you are trying to explain qualitative experience and not
merely quantitative input/output performance, you have to face the
problem of the incommensurability between the
properties of vehicles (the representation in the brain) and what
it feels like to have that representation.
This is the vehicle/content problem, and you cannot wave it away
by saying that spatial experience is explained by a spatial
representation in the brain.
Before calling it a "paradigm shift" you must first show that you
understand the reviewers mean by a "naive" isomorphism (which
is precisely what your paradigm appears to be).
It is not a solution to the mind/body problem to
say: Put something in the head that is isomporphic with the
feeling.
[Jump ahead to author's response]
If you want the paper to appear in BBS, aggressive tone must be
removed. BBS is for constructive peer interaction.
I suggest dropping the apocalyptic talk about paradigms until we
see the impact of the paper.
It is a reasonable thing to ask the proponent of a new approach to
contrast it specifically with its rivals. Declaring that it is a
new paradigm and hence incommensurable with its rivals does not do
the trick.
This confident pre-emptive talk about paradigms certainly makes it
seem as if this paper is not answerable to anyone or anything
(except its future revolutionary impact).
[Jump ahead to author's response]
Fourth version after third
review, June 2002.
I have substantially revised the paper specifically to address the
points raised by yourself and by the reviewers.
A completely revamped and extensive
section 2.3 to address the
vehicle/content issue.
Clarification of the structural
v.s. functional isomorphism issue.
Discussion of Shepard's second-order isomorphism,
psychoneural complementarity, and paramorphism.
A comparison of the Gestalt Bubble model with alternative neural network
models of sense data.
A new section on the
Ultimate Question of Consciousness, to address Searle's contention
that "a computer is not a computer to a computer."
A discussion of emergence in
relation to Davidson's Anomalous Monist thesis.
An expanded discussion of
hemi-neglect
Inserted references to Singer's Temporal Correlation hypothesis.
Removed "The" from the title, which now reads "Subjective
conscious experience" rather than "The Subjective Conscious
Experience."
[Return to originating comment]
Inserted in-depth discussion of alternative models.
Inserted discussion of higher-order isomorphisms.
[Return to originating comment]
I DID address the major issues! Its just that you did not
understand my explanation. I have tried to make them clearer this
time.
Inserted a new paragraph on structural/functional
isomorphism issue.
Wolf Singer has been referenced.
Inserted a whole new section on the vehicle/content
distinction.
[Return to originating comment]
This guy must be a big mucky-muck at a prestigeous institution to be
such a pompous ass! Good riddance to this guy!
[Return to originating comment]
Thank you very kindly for your understanding.
[Return to originating comment]
Dubious Scholarship? Oh my!
What you call "dubious scholarship" and "begging the
question" are exactly the paradigmatic issues that you fail to
comprehend.
It is not "begging the question" to propose that mind corresponds to
our conscious experience, that is merely stating the thesis of
identity theory!
Do I have to solve the whole problem of consciousness just to
propose that spatial experience implicates a spatial
representation in the brain?
Lest I be accused of being "not responsive to reviewers critiques"
I have inserted a whole new
section on the Ultimate
Question of Consciousness just to address Searle's contention that
"a computer isn't even a computer to a computer".
Searle is being naive when he says we see the paper
itself, not merely a percept of the paper. One man's
obvious is another man's absurd!
If conscious experience is neither in the head, nor
out in the world, then it does not exist as a scientific
entity!
According to Identity Theory, those causes and correlates
are an identity! You state your paradigmatic hypothesis as
if it were plain fact!
A whole new section has been
added to clarify the alternative paradigmatic hypotheses, and why
they are all untenable.
The word "predictions" has been removed.
[Return to originating comment]
The remaining substantive prima facie issues are now addressed in
the new section on
Spirituality, Supervenience, and Other Nomological Danglers.
I AM being required to address all of the
implications for each BBS specialty exhaustively! If you look at this whole review, that
is exactly what I am being required to do!
Both the reviewers, and the editor, are rejecting a
paradigm, wherever you see the words "begging the question"
and "non-sequitur". You assume that supervenience and
vehicle/content theories are established fact, while identity
theory must be proven beyond a doubt. But they are both
paradigmatic hypotheses and are equally valid!
[Return to originating comment]
The vehicle/content distinction is now addressed in the new
section on
Spirituality, Supervenience, and Other Nomological Danglers.
Higher-order Shepardian, complementary, and other isomorphisms are now
discussed.
A paradigm is a paradigm is a paradigm! It does not matter what I
do or do not understand!
What makes a paradigm is not that it sweeps the world and achieves
broad popular acclaim. What makes a proposal paradigmatic is the
foundational nature of the assumptions that it challenges!
It is a solution to the mind/body problem to propose that
mind and brain are not distinct, but they are one and the same
thing!
You don't have to accept identity theory as your personal
philosophy. I admit that is a really big one to swallow. But you
must acknowledge that it is at least equally valid, prima facie,
as the alternative supervenience and vehicle/content theories.
[Return to originating comment]
This reviewer was really bad! I can't believe you still defend him
after his shameful and embarassing performance!
You seem to completely misunderstand the paradigmatic issue.
A paradigmatic proposal is paradigmatic whether or not it ever has
any impact on anyone!
I raise the paradigmatic issue not to get special dispensation from having
to justify my theory, but because you and some of the
reviewers seem to believe that your own paradigm is a statement of
fact, rather than merely an unsubstantiated initial assumption.
There is now a new section discussing alternative neural network
models of sense data.
[Return to originating comment]
BBS Responds:
Accepted!!! for open peer commentary, September 2002.
Open Peer Commentaries received February 2003.
Response to Commentaries submitted March 2003.