The author does not believe that any aspect of perception lacks a neurophysiological counterpart. In fact, this very point is elaborated in the section on isomorphism, immediately following the above statement. The main intent of this paper is to identify and challenge implicit and unstated assumptions in the conventional view, and this assumption is one of them. It is a commonly held view that the internal representation is abstracted relative to the subjective percept, and this view is embodied in models such as Marr's Vision, and Biederman's Geon theory, which lack an explicit surface reification mechanism. In so doing, they are implicitly subscribing to the view that the conscious experience is an illusion, a view supported by Rensink's experiment. If challenged on this point, they may very well deny it, and yet this assumption is embodied in their models, and it is my intention to highlight this unstated implication of their non-isomorphic models. Since the subjective experience of reification is undeniable, I maintain that either reification is actually performed explicitly by the visual system, or reification is a subjective manifestation without neurophysiological counterpart. The obvious absurdity of the latter statement simply supports the veracity of the former statement, which is a point worthy of emphasis.