Here again the reviewer speaks as if the naive realist, or vehicle/content distinction view is an established fact, rather than merely an initial hypothesis. The reviewer's statement (as if it were plain fact) that "when we look at this paper we observe this paper not our experience of this paper," and "from a first-person perspective we can only observe the things in the world (what the representations are of)" [as opposed to representations of them], is merely a statement of his paradigmatic hypothesis, not a statement of fact.

The whole point of the identity hypothesis is exactly that when we look at this paper, we observe not the paper itself, but we do in fact observe only our experience of the paper. And from a first-person perspective we cannot observe the things in the world (what the representations are of), we can only observe the representations of those things.

This reviewer speaks as if there is only one paradigmatic hypothesis that can be validly proposed, and that is the consensus view. But it is in the very nature of paradigmatic hypotheses that they are exactly that, hypotheses, not to be confused with statements of fact, even when they are generally held.

As for Searle, the reviewer insists that he "is not being naive but merely pointing out the obvious - that experiences are in a sense "transparent" - that when we look at this paper we observe this paper not our experience of this paper. Or to put it more accurately, the paper that we see is what we experience." This might seem obvious to Searle, and to this reviewer, but only because of their naive realist assumptions. From an indirect realist perspective, that is not at all obvious, in fact it is absurd. The "obvious" fact is that we cannot see the world directly, but only by way of its representational replica in the brain. Unless we invoke magical mystical principles beyond the bounds of science, there is no way that our conscious experience can project back out of the body to appear out in the world around us.