Once again, this reviewer is missing the point. While it is true that "Searle would not deny that conscious experiences can be observed (as conscious experiences) in the sense that they can be reported on,", that is not what we are talking about. Because when Searle reports on his conscious experience of a table, say, he believes that his experience is an awareness of the table itself where it lies out in the world. He does not acknowledge that the sense-data of his experience of the table are distinct from the table itself. That is why Searle says (p. 97) "What about my own inner goings-on? Can I not observe those? The very fact of subjectivity, which we were trying to observe, makes such an observation impossible. Why? Because where conscious subjectivity is concerned, there is no distinction between the observation and the thing observed, between the perception and the object perceived."

So Searle does indeed deny that conscious experiences can be observed as objects in their own right, distinct from the objective objects out in the world. The experience of direct perception can be reported on, but the objects of direct perception are (supposedly) the external objects themselves, which is why the observation, the consciousness, is (according to Searle) impossible to observe, all we can report on is our experience of observing objects in the world. The objects of our observations are (according to Searle) the objects themselves, which is why the consciousness of those objects appears (to Searle) invisible, or impossible to observe.