First of all, what makes a paradigmatic proposal is not that it achieves popular acclaim and becomes widely accepted. What makes a paradigmatic proposal is the foundational nature of the assumptions that it challenges. It makes no difference whether the paradigmatic proposal is ever generally accepted. For example solipsism is a paradigmatic hypothesis, even though nobody but a madman actually believes in it. But it is paradigmatic nonetheless, by its very nature, and it is equally valid logically speaking, to the alternative hypothesis that there is an external world. That does not mean that solipsism is right, or even that it is equally likely to be right; it means only that solipsism cannot be discounted off-hand just because nobody happens to believe in it. It must be shown to be false or at least unlikely, if it is to be rejected, it is not sufficient that it is simply unpopular.

So I don't claim exemption from having to prove the truth of identity theory because one day it will sweep the world and become the dominant paradigm. At the glacial rate things are going, that may never happen, or at least not in my lifetime! I claim the exemption because the alternative hypothesis, that mind is something other than just the functioning of the physical brain, is itself a paradigmatic hypothesis which was never proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore identity theory should not be held to a higher standard of proof merely because it was proposed at a later date.

You say that "The problem is not one of addressing the implications [of the model] exhaustively," and yet when you look at this whole review, you can see that is exactly what I am being required to do! I began with a simple idea: that the properties of the world of experience are a valid source of evidence for the nature of the internal representation in the brain. How could it possibly be otherwise? If the world of experience takes the form of a volumetric spatial structure, that is direct evidence for a volumetric spatial representation in the brain. That is a perfectly valid proposal, and if I might say so, an interesting new angle on an old problem. I even insulated myself from neurophysiological objections by presenting my theory as a perceptual model rather than a neural model, knowing full well (from long hard experience) that otherwise the paper would be rejected outright on the grounds of "neural plausibility." And the perceptual modeling approach also insulates me against philosophical objections, because since I am modeling consciousness directly, the model remains safely on the subjective side of the mind/brain barrier, and therefore issues of mind/brain relation simply do not apply. It is perfectly valid to carve out a sub-problem and address it individually, for unless one chooses to deny that our experience of the world is three-dimensional and volumetric (only the likes of Dennett and Pylyshyn would have the temerity to deny something so plainly obvious to all but those with theoretical axes to grind) it is perfectly valid to model three-dimensional spatial experience with a three-dimensional spatial model. The original paper, as originally submitted, was a perfectly valid candidate for publication, and would have contributed considerably to the debate on the dimensions of conscious experience, independent of neurophysiological and philosophical considerations.

But it didn't do any good. The reviewers immediately spotted the paradigmatic issue at the core of the theory. And they badgered me to elaborate on the philosophical and neurophysiological implications, even though this has no relevance whatsoever to a pure perceptual model. I tried to resist, knowing how they would shriek when they heard the philosophical infrastructure to what I am proposing. That issue could have easily been left to a subsequent, more philosophical paper. But I bowed to the pressure to discuss the philosophical implications, and in the second version of the paper I went ahead and presented "The Epistemological Divide". But of course that did not satisfy the reviewers, it only raised more questions about the ontology of conscious experience, and how it relates to neurophysiology, questions that have no significance for a purely perceptual model. But the more I elaborate, the more they get agitated, because they recognize (quite correctly) that I am coming from a completely different set of initial assumptions than their own, and the more they hear about it, the more objections they raise, in an ever-expanding spiral out of control! But the profound error that the reviewers make is in assuming that their initial assumptions are more valid than mine, because "everybody knows" that there are no "pictures in the head," so there must be something trivially wrong with Lehar's model, even if they can't think to articulate exactly what that error might be. But there are times when "everybody" is just plain wrong! If there were no "pictures in the head," then we would not see the world in the form of (volumetric) "pictures"! It is as simple as that!

I tried to explain this in the last round of review. Apparently I did not get through, as I was chided for being "not responsive to a number of substantive referee's points." In this round of review therefore I have answered all of those "substantive" points, even though they still have nothing to do with the central thesis that it is valid to model a spatial experience with a spatial model. And you will see that these answers steer the paper far afield from the original focus of the paper, as intended by the author. You will also find (surprise, surprise!) that neither you, nor the reviewers, will be convinced by any of these responses because they are all argued based on indirect realist assumptions, what you call "begging the question." If you continue to maintain that supervenience and vehicle/content theories of consciousness are intrinsically more valid logically than the alternative identity theory view, such that the former requires no proof or validation, but the latter does, then this paper will be unjustly rejected on paradigmatic grounds.

I am not completely naive. I realize full well how it must grate on your academic sensibilities to have an unpublished upstart like myself without even an official appointment at a reputable institution, to be lecturing an experienced and reputable professor like yourself on paradigmatic issues. I realize that this must sound to you like fingernails scraping across a blackboard, and does nothing to advance my chances of publication. But I have already tried (in earlier submissions to different journals) the role of submissive wall-flower, waiting for reviewers to recognize the paradigmatic nature of my proposal by themselves. It has not worked for me. For although they recognize that I have different initial assumptions, they naturally assume that their paradigm is right ("everybody knows" that it is so! There is a "large literature...") and that mine is naturally wrong unless I can prove to them otherwise. I've been through this process many times before, and every time it follows the same pattern. At first they are intrigued; it is refreshing for a change to read something really new and different, and they respond enthusiastically with a veritable barrage of questions and comments. (See O'Brien & Opie, reviewers 2, round 2) But they are also convinced from the outset that it is fundamentally wrong-headed, so they rattle out the standard objections on each of the peripheral issues. But because we are arguing at paradigmatic cross-purposes, they are never ultimately convinced, and at the very end of a long and gruelling process, the paper is finally rejected--ostensibly on the grounds that I had no adequate answer to their standard objections, but actually because they did not understand the key issue that their paradigm is no more valid than mine. I've been through this process now so many times that I can see it coming in advance! (see reviewer #3, last round!) But I feel helpless to prevent it from happening all over again!

This time I have tried a different approach as a desperate measure of last resort. This time I have tried the radical new notion that maybe they will understand if I just explain it straight, the way it is, no bullshit, and no mincing words, just the straight truth as I see it, regardless of whose academic sensibilities get bruised. At this point in my academic "career" (if it can be called such!) I have absolutely nothing left to lose, so I might as well give it a try! Believe it or not, I am a rather shy and retiring person, and this approach grates on my sensibilities just as much as it must on yours. But maybe at least if I spell it out to them, maybe then they will understand.

But will they? The jury is still out!