Section 2.3, now titled "Spirituality, Supervenience, and Other Nomological Danglers," has been thoroughly rewritten specifically to address the vehicle/content distinction.

Just because Dennett draws a distinction between the neural vehicles and their phenomenal contents, that does not in any way guarantee that they are really separate and distinct entities. They may still be different aspects of one and the same essential structure. In other words, it may very well be that the phenomenal "contents" are identically equal to the neural "vehicles", in which case they would necessarily be isomorphic, just as "George W. Bush" is (at the moment) necessarily isomorphic in every possible way with the person known as "the President of the United States." It would be absurd to claim that "George W." exists in physical space, while "the President" has no real spatial extent, and does not exist in any space known to science.

Now if Dennett wishes to claim that the neural vehicles are not isomorphic with their phenomenal contents, the onus is on him to demonstrate that that is the case. Otherwise, the more parsimonious explanation is an identity theory, because that employs a single explanans, the physical brain, to account for the properties of both mind and brain. In fact, to claim otherwise is to invoke a kind of nomological dangler, in which conscious experience is observed as a spatial structure, but it does not exist in any space known to science. This is now explained in the new Section 2.3.